Thursday, May 22, 2025

Retardation and dark energy

Let us have a collapsing spherical shell of dust. In this blog we have been claiming that a clock at the center cannot know the gravity potential right "now" in the coordinate time, and will tick faster than predicted by general relativity. We claim that the rate of a clock is an "effect" of the gravity field, and the effect cannot propagate faster than light.

We have been struggling to calculate how this will affect the collapse of a uniform dust ball.

In FLRW models, the expansion of the (dust-filled) universe will slow down as if gravity would be newtonian: we can study a small spatially spherical volume of the universe, and we obtain the deceleration from newtonian gravity.

We believe that the dust-filled universe in an FLRW model behaves like an expanding dust ball in an asymptotically Minkowski space.

We have been struggling to incorporate the retardation effect to this newtonian model of expansion (or collapse) of a dust ball.

Let us, once again, try to figure out what happens. We will study a collapse of a uniform dust ball in an asymptotically Minkowski space.


Retardation makes the gravity potential well shallower: a rubber sheet model


We believe that a clock inside a collapsing dust ball is not aware of the acceleration of individual dust particles far away. Therefore, the potential, as defined by the clock rate, is higher than one would calculate if one would assume that the clock knows the configuration "right now" in the coordinate time.


                          bulge
      ___                                        ___  rubber sheet
            \•______----------______•/
   weight  --->                  <--- weight
      

In a rubber sheet model of gravity, a contracting ring of weights will have the rubber sheet bulged upward at the center, because the rubber at the center of the ring does not yet know that the weights in the ring have been accelerated as they fall lower.

As the weights slide lower, potential energy is released. Most of the potential energy will go to the kinetic energy of the weights. Some will go to a "longitudinal" wave in the rubber sheet, that is, to the stretching of the bulge, and the kinetic energy of the rubber sheet.

In this model, the "gravity" simulated by the rubber sheet is somewhat weaker because not all released potential energy goes to the kinetic energy.

Presumably, the weakening effect grows stronger when the ring contracts. But could it entirely cancel the acceleration of the simulated "gravity" at some point? (Dark energy seems to be accelerating the expansion of the universe.)

Then all the potential energy released would at some point go to the deformation of the rubber sheet and the kinetic energy of the rubber sheet.

      
                   • -----______----- •
                              pit


Could it be that the bulge has time to flip into a "pit" at some point? Then the simulated "gravity" would appear stronger.


Modeling the retarded gravity field with a rubber sheet: a singularity appears


Let us have a mass M which is initially static. Then we start to accelerate it at a constant acceleration a.


                                                 observers
               ● ---> a      R              ×     r     ×
              M                                2            1

             ----->
      

Let observer 1 be such that he is not yet aware of the acceleration of M. 

Let us use the standard retardation rule: observer 2 sees the location of M as if M would have moved at the constant speed v, where v is the last observation that observer 2 made.

The gravity potential V(x) seen by observer 2 is continuous in x, but the derivative dV / dx in not continuous. The derivative should be continuous in a rubber sheet model?

                   ____
                  /               --> v
           -----
        rubber sheet


If we have a sharp turn moving in the rubber sheet, then the acceleration of the sheet is infinite at the turn. It is a singularity – nonsensical.


An electric charge which is suddenly accelerated



















How does the Edward M. Purcell calculation handle the analogous case for the electromagnetic field?

The electric field lines above are continuous, but make sharp turns. Can we produce those turns with a time-varying magnetic field which does not contain a singularity?










We can determine the curl of B from the time-varying field E. Is there a guarantee that B will not contain sources, and that the curl of E satisfies the upper equation?

If we would use the standard retardation formula for the electric potential V, then at the rightmost point of the circle above,

       dE / dt

would be infinite. But the requirement that the electric field lines are continuous means that we cannot apply the retardation rule to the potential V at that point.

What about the sharp turns of the electric field lines at other places? There, dE / dt is infinite and the curl of B is infinite. That seems nonsensical. Suppose then that we make the turns smooth.

When the charge q moves to the right, the magnetic field B takes the well known for of field lines circling the trajectory of q.

Let us accelerate q to the right. The second formula above is, at least approximately, satisfied. The same holds for the first formula.

In electromagnetism, the electric potential V does not have any direct effect on anything. It does not make clocks to tick slower. Therefore, the rubber sheet model does not describe electromagnetism. The potential V can change infinitely fast inside a contracting or expanding shell of charges.

We conclude that the electromagnetic analogy is not useful for us.


A new take: a tense rubber sheet


Let us try to prove that the bulge can turn into a pit. 


                          bulge
      ___                                         ___ rubber sheet
             \•______----------______•/
   weight --->                  <--- weight


Let the rubber sheet be very tense. We can assume that the weights move much slower than the waves in the rubber sheet.

Let us assume that the weights start moving. A bulge forms. Could it turn into a pit as the rubber sheet tries to straighten itself up at the center area?

No, it is not possible.


The clock on the bulge runs fast: the observer at the bulge sees the contraction of the dust shell to slow down mysteriously?


This could finally explain why the collapse of a dust shell appears to slow down. If we reverse time, then the expansion would speed up mysteriously, just like in dark energy.



***  WORK IN PROGRESS  ***



Sunday, May 11, 2025

Problems in the anthropic principle

People appeal to the anthropic principle to explain the following observation:

- the laws of nature seem to be fine-tuned to allow biological life.


Anthropic reasoning goes this way: if the laws would not be fine-tuned, then there would exist no observer who would be wondering the fine-tuning.

Let us analyze what exactly is involved in the reasoning. What are the assumptions?


If there can only exist one universe, then the anthropic principle does not explain anything


Suppose that laws of nature dictate that exactly one universe must exist. Not zero or 2. 

Why are the laws of nature fine-tuned to allow biological life and sentient observers in that one universe?

The anthropic principle in this case does not explain anything. It could well be that the only universe is not suitable for life.

The existence of observers in our universe is an a posteriori observed fact. There is nothing a priori which requires observers.


Religious assumptions: the one universe must be fine-tuned for life


Let us assume that laws of nature dictate that exactly one universe must exist.

There might be a law of nature which requires that observers must exist in that one universe, and that I must be born as a creature which as an adult will become an observer. This would explain my a posteriori observation.

These assumptions resemble a religion: the laws of nature must be fine-tuned for life. It is like the creation myth in the Bible.

John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler formulated a hypothetical law of nature: the universe must be constructed in such a way that intelligent observers will arise.


A multiverse and the anthropic principle


Let us then assume that there exists a vast number of universes, with different laws of nature. Some models in "string theory" have this assumption: the multiverse.

Then there might exist a very large number of universes suitable for life. Many universes will contain observers.

Let us assume the following:

1.   My "soul" is predestined to be born inside a creature which will be sentient and become an observer as an adult.

2.   There are many universes with such creatures.


Then it is not surprising at all that I was born into a universe which contains observers.

Note that we need assumption 1, too, in addition to 2. If I would be predestined to be born either as a human, a rock, or an electron, then 2 would not explain why I happen to be an observer. Why am I not an electron?


Why do I find myself being one of the first intelligent observers on Earth?


There have been a huge number of vertebrates on Earth in the past 530 million years. Only about 10 billion humans have, so far, been aware of other galaxies besides the Milky Way.

Can an anthropic principle explain why I am among the first such observers on Earth?

If Earth could not harbor life, there would exist no such observers. This is the standard anthropic argument.

But there is no reason why I should be among the first. Why not the 10²⁰'th such observer?

We come back to the doomsday argument.


Observers could exist in the universe, but I could be a fish?


The a posteriori observation which I have made is that intelligent observers exist in a universe which contains billions of galaxies.

If I were a fish living in the year 2025, I would not have made such observation, even though it is true currently.

What do anthropic principles say about this?

They say that life must exist in our universe. But do they say anything about why I am not a fish?

An analogous question: suppose that on some exoplanet there exists an observer who is far superior to humans. A man is like a fish to this superobserver. Why was I born as a human (= fish), and not as the superobserver?

Weak anthropic principles basically say that for an observer of a type A to exist, the universe must be such that A can exist. That is close to a tautology. Obviously, it cannot answer to more complex questions, like "why was I not born as a fish?"

A human fetus may not be much more intelligent than an adult fish. If my "soul" would choose its birthplace by random from creatures which have some rudimentary intelligence, it is extremely unlikely that I would be born as a human fetus, which as an adult will be one of the first 10 billion humans to know about about galaxies.


We need stronger principles than the weak anthropic principles, to explain why "I" am among the first intelligent observers on Earth


Let us look at so-called strong anthropic principles.

Barrow and Tipler (1986) proposed at least the following variants:

1.   laws of nature require that there must exists exactly one universe, and that universe must contain observers;

2.   laws of nature require that any existing universe must contain observers (e.g., in quantum mechanics, an observer is required to make the wave function to collapse);

3.   laws of nature require that there must exist many universes (and some must contain observers).


All these imply that there exists at least one universe with observers. But they do not explain why I was not born as a fish. They do not explain why I was able to observe that this universe contains observers. Furthermore, they do not explain why I am among the ~ 10 billion first intelligent observers on Earth.


The Copernican principle



The Copernican principle can be stated like this: the physical location of the Solar system is "typical" in the universe. It is not the center of any important cosmological structure. The principle is strictly in contradiction with the Ptolemaic model of the Solar system where Earth is the center of everything.

Empirical observations strongly support the Copernican principle. 

What about the Copernican principle in the time dimension?

The doomsday argument is a Copernican principle with respect to time.

Do we exist at a "typical" time in the history of universe? No. The universe is expected to be very much suitable for life for ar least 1,000 billion years. We are living in a "young" universe.

The Copernican principle does not seem to hold on the surface of Earth. I am not a fish.


Conclusions


"Weak" anthropic principles are almost tautologies.

"Strong" anthropic principles contain a very brave hypothetical law of nature: a universe must necessarily produce "observers" at some point of time.

The Copernican principle is true for the spatial location of the Solar system, but it is not true with respect to the time dimension. Furthermore, on Earth the spatial Copernican principle does not hold at all: I was born a human and not a fish, even though there are more instances of a fish than a human.

Can we conclude that there must exist a mysterious law of nature "outside our universe", which places us to the current epoch and into conscious observers called humans?

Yes, that is the natural conclusion. Note that even if we would be placed at a random epoch, also that would a constitute a law of nature: you can expect to exist at a random epoch.

Ordinary laws of physics do not say anything about where and when we can expect to exist as an observer. Laws of quantum physics do talk about a collapse of a wave function caused by an "observer". Usually, people assume that the "observer" can be any large object which causes the wave function to "decohere". That does not require that I am the observer.

We can talk about natural laws of the placement of the subject. The placement seems to be non-random.

Suppose that you buy a new computer game and choose the character you are going to play in the game. The game is the "universe" and the character is the "observer". Obviously, the character will probably not be a random character in the game.

The hypothesis that our universe is a computer game, explains why we find ourselves living during a very special epoch as very special observers. The hypothesis implies strong anthropic principles: a computer game always contains "observers" if it has players.

What other hypothesis could explain our special position?

The doomsday argument is refuted because we are not born as random humans. The big oversight in the doomsday argument is that it assumes that we somehow know the prior probabilities of how we would be placed as observers. We do not know.

Suppose then that we would find ourselves as random observers. Why would we be random? What hypothesis could explain that?












In Plato's allegory of the cave, people have spent their entire life chained to the wall of a cave. They see shadows projected on the opposite wall. They do not see the real world, only shadows. However, through philosophy, one can learn about the real world.

Plato's allegory is somewhat similar to the computer game hypothesis. We are living inside a computer game. But through mathematics and logic we can learn something of the real world which exists outside the game.

When I started this blog in 2013, I, unfortunately, named it "metaphysical thoughts". The blog had been about physics, not metaphysics. The current blog post and the previous one can honestly be called "metaphysics". We finally have some content which fits the name of this blog!

Saturday, May 10, 2025

The doomsday argument

The doomsday argument was popularized in the 1980s by the astrophysicist Brandon Carter, a colleague of Stephen Hawking.


The argument is so simple that it has been invented several times in the course of history.

People estimate that ~ 100 billion individuals of homo sapiens have lived on Earth in the past 250,000 years. Suppose that I was "chosen" by some mechanism to be a random individual among all the homo sapiens who will ever live.

Then it is likely that the total number of homo sapiens who will ever live will be something like ~ 200 billion. If we assume that the population of Earth will stay at 10 billion, then homo sapiens is expected to go extinct in ~ 700 years.

How could the number future homo sapiens could be so low, only 10¹¹? If humans will colonize exoplanets, there might be 10¹⁷ humans living in the next 10,000 years.

The doomsday argument is an example of anthropic reasoning.



Could it be that humans will be replaced by artificial intelligence machines?


What if artificial intelligence machines will replace humans in the future? Communication between exoplanets is slow. Each colonized exoplanet must have at least one instance of AI, autonomous from other instances. If the AI sends space probes, each probe must have an autonomous AI instance.

If humans are replaced by AI machines, we expect a very large number of autonomous, individual AI machines to exist in the future.

Why was I born as an instance of homo sapiens and not an instance of an AI machine? Or is it so that only ~ 100 billion AI machines will exist in the future?


Why was I born as homo sapiens, and not a random vertebrate?


Vertebrates appeared on Earth 530 million years ago. There has been a huge number of individuals in the past. The 100 billion instances of homo sapiens is an extremely tiny fraction of all instances of vertebrates which have lived.

Why am I not a random instance of a vertebrate, living some time in the past 530 million years?

Maybe I was destined to be born as a "self-conscious" being? But I was not born that way: a fetus or a newborn child is not self-conscious in the way that an adult is.


The self-indication assumption objection refutes the doomsday argument


The self-indication assumption is one way to refute the doomsday argument. Suppose that I am one of an almost infinite number N of "souls" who may be born as homo sapiens, or not be born at all. If I then find myself born as homo sapiens, I cannot deduce anything about the number of homo sapiens who will ever live.

Let us have two possible worlds:

- A: 200 billion homo sapiens will live;

- B: 10¹⁰⁰ homo sapiens will live.


Let, a priori, the probability of A and B be both 0.5.

Let me find myself living as the 100 billionth instance of homo sapiens in the world. Can I now deduce anything more about the probabilities of A and B?

No. In both cases, A and B, the probability of me being born as the 100 billionth instance is the same.


Self-indication assumption and vertebrates


The self-indication assumption does not answer the question: why was I born as an intelligent vertebrate (homo sapiens), and not as an average vertebrate (a small fish)?

There may exist a huge number of homo sapiens in the future, but that does not explain why I was born as homo sapiens at a time when only a tiny fraction of all instances of vertebrates have been homo sapiens.


I was not born as a random instance of a vertebrate?


This is the natural hypothesis: I was somehow predestined to be born as a being which becomes self-aware as an adult. There was no randomness in this.

Then it is also natural to assume that I was not born as a random instance of homo sapiens.

The doomsday argument is refuted because there is no randomness.

If there is no randomness, then there is some law of nature outside our universe. That law of nature brought me here.

The doomsday argument itself assumes that there is a law of nature outside our universe: that a "random process" causes me to be born as an instance of homo sapiens.


Criticism of the self-indication assumption




Nick Bostrom (2002) argued that the self-indication assumption leads to absurd consequences. Bostrom's argument is called the "presumptuous philosopher".

Suppose that we have two possible cosmologies:

- A: there are only 10¹¹ conscious observers in the universe;

- B: there are 10¹⁰⁰ conscious observers in the universe.


A priori, A and B have a probability 0.5. I am a conscious observer. Can a I deduce if I am in A or B?

Let us use the self-indication assumption. Let us assume that "souls" are assigned at random from the very large pool of N souls to the universe. Let us assume that I am a random soul in the pool. I realize that I was born. This implies that I am almost certainly in the universe B, not in A. Let us call the reasoning in this paragraph P.

Nick Bostrom is quoted in Wikipedia saying that it is "absurd" if one can draw the conclusion above in the reasoning P. He believes that the absurdity discredits the self-indication assumption.

We in our blog do not think that the reasoning P is absurd – rather, P is the natural conclusion if the randomization model and the pool of N souls is correct.

The weakness in P is that we do not know if the assumptions are correct. It certainly does not look like that my soul was assigned randomly into the universe.


Conclusions


The doomsday argument probably does not hold. It is easily refuted by the self-indication assumption. It is also refuted if there is no randomness. We cannot claim that only ~ 200 billion humans will ever live.

There seems to be a law of nature which is outside our universe. That law of nature decides in what role I am born.

In quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wave function, or in the many-worlds interpretation, how we choose the branch in which we live, is an unsolved mystery. The mystery looks like the question "why I was born as this instance of homo sapiens?"

We have to think about this: what kind of a law of nature outside our universe could possible solve the mystery in quantum mechanics?